Analysis and Recommendations
Marion David Newberry
FOB Marez, Ninewa Province, Iraq
18 February 2009
Executive Summary
This report includes professional experiences, observations, analyses, and recommendations for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of Iraq through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) structure. My experience was with the PRT in Mosul City, Ninewa Province, Iraq. I was assigned as the Section Leader for Health and Education to the PRT and answered to the Department of State PRT Team Leader.
My career experience (45 years) includes developing refugee resettlement health screening program components, international health program assessments, development of health assessment procedures and evaluation manuals for international partners, training in epidemiology and health program development, as well as my participation in the eradication of smallpox, guinea worm and polio.
My intention is not to condemn all of the DOS employees in Iraq, but an attempt to better illustrate how the results can improve dramatically, once personal career ambitions become secondary to the mission of reconstruction. Ordained achievements were largely political and directed from the Bagdad Office of Provincial Authority (OPA). The idea that a successful reconstruction model furthers one’s career apparently was never entertained. My overall observation is that Iraq Provincial Reconstruction effort in its current iteration under the Department of State (DOS) is woefully lacking in direction, coordination, leadership, accountability, imagination, external supervision, and effectiveness. There are continued failures to consult and plan with our Iraqi counterparts, develop and conduct needs assessments, evaluate options, and develop infrastructure, of which I was originally assigned to help accomplish.
The DOS is not the agency to perform these functions. It is more appropriately the job of its sister agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). For DOS to perform the job of reconstruction in Iraq is like sending in the Coast Guard to accomplish the mission better handled by an armored infantry division.
USAID demonstrated leadership during the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) activity during the 2003 period. Assigned USAID officials are among the most capable partners at the PRT level. USAID works at the community level and provides collaboration that improves achievements levels. It is recognized that there are limitations in terms of both funding and flexibility in use of AID funds.
The final major recommendations are as follows: 1) PRT members should be assigned a minimum of 24 months; 2) PRTs should be led by former local (county/city-level) managers experienced in managing diverse government operations; 3) PRTs need to be USAID-led and supervised by technical experts that are skilled in local administration management.
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To whom it may Concern:
Exit Review for David Newberry, Chief
Health and Education Section
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Nine Province, FOB Marez, Iraq
As my tour in Iraq nears completion I remain both awed by the willingness and determination of the Iraqi people to reestablish a “normal” life of providing a living for their families, education for their children, and a healthy future for their grandchildren, and frustrated by the inadequacy of the system that our government has designed to address the problems of reconstruction. My situation is illustrious of this conundrum. I leave with feelings gratitude for the wonderful young men and women with whom I had the honor of working and who guarded my life with theirs, courage of some members of the Iraqi government who continued to come to work to rebuild their country while under a threat of death by those who wish to continue the chaos of jihad, and the wonderful and infinite curiosity of the children who long for and example to which they can attach their destiny. I leave, too, with a lingering sense of failure from my inability to obtain funding through the Provincial Reconstruction Team leader for easy, effective, and innovative opportunities to bring a measure of involvement between the PRT and my Iraqi counterparts through programs to involve school children providing clean water for their families and light in their schools. I also leave with feelings of technical inadequacy in my inability to bridge the abyss between what can be done and what I was allowed to do. And finally, I am saddened by the great divide between the Iraqi people outside the barb wire of this camp and the rest PRT staff as organized under the Department of State (DOS) and Office of Provincial Authority (OPA). This report serves as my Exit Report in lieu of the fact that my PRT Team Leader chose not to either conduct such an interview or say farewell to me after nearly 11 full months serving as a team member of the PRT, Ninewa Province.
Realistically, in December 2007, I expected to find a reconstruction situation and operation similar to the one I left in Iraq October 2003. This has proved to be even more of a fable than one could have written into a movie plot or even imagine. Our DOS training included numerous DOS role playing, problem analysis, solutions with infrastructure development and capacity building. Various funds were designated as available to bridge the gap between current problems with funding solutions or to create capacity for Iraqi joint ownership and fiscal support as available.
I want to make it clear that I am neither a diplomat nor am I strategic command person. I do have expertise and skills in health programmatic development and experience in education management and development. The culture, language, and intellect of Iraqis and history of this nation are such that we – Americans - should be taking notes from our colleagues here. We should be sitting in their classrooms making lists of things to do in collaboration with our partners and most importantly, when we say we are going to do something - then keep our word and do it without politics or policy development created by DOS PRT leadership and absolute control by the US Department of State officials who lack the skills, knowledge and the common sense to implement and support programmatic efforts needed to reconstruct Iraq. If they were not here to play that role, what role are they to play? It did not appear to me that they had much interest in, nor a relationship to, the title of their team.
Our partners, the Iraqi people have been made so many promises that were never kept – such that we could pave the road all the way to Egypt with them. What makes the situation even more curious is the implementing structure at the provincial level. Here, there four types of professionals: those who are Department of State (DOS) career seeking individuals and many of them will be rewarded because the DOS system has no H R mechanism for anything better or worse – if one serves in Iraq one can go pass “Go” in terms of career enhancement. It does not appear to be related to the “Mission” I was lead to believe I was coming to Iraq to help accomplish. So a DOS person or FSO comes out to Iraq and he/she spends one year (or more) during which time there little professional accountability and success is measured in terms of what was or what was not accomplished (numbers), but more importunely measures developed on DOS a measurement standard – which is often founded on a lack of accountability and for what was not accomplished. But, regardless, there were no “waves” created. The DOS RULES either way. The second major “player” group then is the military heroes and heroines who fought to win the military war and are presently stuck trying to keep doing “good things” like building and rebuilding schools, repairing hospitals, and other brick and mortar projects. It seems to me that we should go shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqis to take on whatever tasks they prioritize and become partners with their efforts. This must be accomplished within the normal cost, without corruption and with a financial fluidity that keeps the Iraqi’s in charge and to reduce cost in ways that will reduce corruption and assure quality control. This means taking responsibility with our Iraqi partners, in developing capacity to perform, even low cost Brick and mortar tasks with ethical concerns regarding the impact on the present and future generation.
Currently the US Government builds schools in Ninewa Province without consulting the Directorate General for Education regarding location, land ownership, appropriate structure, and cost or education staffing requirements. Schools may be built using Iraqi money or US dollars. This problem has become less obvious through a few mechanisms established by the military. Some of these school buildings are located where there are too few school age children to justify a building or worse these schools are inferior in construction and not coordinated with the entire provincial plan or priority needs. In some situations these schools were not even built on Iraqi Government property. The coordination issues need protocols and some structure.
Meanwhile the military are frustrated generally trying to do good while the PRT is playing whatever game the DOS wants to play. The USA military, Civil Affairs staff (CAs) try to work at the lowest and most important levels of the country while the PRT leadership meanders around the country-side hobnobbing with the elate Iraqi societal leadership with menus for women rights, governance, and whatever other USA based programmatic issues are considered as politically expedient. This is not to say that these kinds or programs are not important but it is important to state that we should be seeking the Iraqi prioritization of issues and programs for saving lives and reconstruction support. At the PRT level we have seen a succession of leadership and authority that alternates between autocratic leadership and/or weak individuals who wouldn’t know or even guess what the Iraqi people really want. Worse, such leadership really does not care and will have no clue how to help rebuild a nation that has never experienced a government by the people, and for the people. Good leadership and a team builder is one who must take the wide range of experts into a strong force for rebuilding Iraq. The individual Iraqi is the one the needs the opportunity to forge a future that is structured in his or her lifetime with a sense of ownership and in such a way that insurgents and others can not take it away from them.
Expertise needs to be harnessed to improve the education, health and welfare of every Iraqi. We have initiated studies and made recommendations to improve the maturation of the Iraqi children while saving lives. We recommended a specific water sampling study coupled with a water purification component using solar and ultraviolet light. We wanted to sample fifty sampling points along the Tigris River that are used by household members as a drinking water source. The proposal was scheduled to include testing for organisms in matched samples exposed to the sun and non-exposed samples. The cost was $11,645. It was turned down by the PRT leader because the Iraqi people could purchase (with money they do not have because they are unemployed) iodine tablets or add Clorox to their drinking water. Is tiring to work seven days a week as a technical person and have some poorly informed and selective listening diplomat make decisions that guarantee failure in terms of creating infrastructure, improving capacity or even creating real employment for the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people don’t have jobs, lack food, and have lost hope that Americans will help solve the problem. In addition, the civil situation is such that the Governor has had 11 staff members assassinated and those who work for the Americans are likewise at risk. In January 2008 the Mosul City Chief of police was killed by a suicide bomber in broad daylight. I wonder how many Americans would go to work if they and their families were at risk of being murdered.
The second type of person assigned to a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is usually a technical expert in a field of law, economics, construction, water, electricity, public health or education. Obviously the technical experts must have free access to our Iraqi partners and listen to what they say and analyze each situation to better determine a remedial course of action that is basically owned by the Iraqi people. Technical staff should be given adequate funds to make commitments and to keep them at all times. When our Iraqi partners make commitments we should honor those statements and support their prioritized programs. Iraqi “buy in” should be on their terms rather than some DOS professional who does not understand how the culture works nor interested in understanding it. To many of them a tour in Iraq is something to be endured as a means of career enhancement based not on what they accomplished or it quality of their effort. Actual performance just doesn’t seem to matter. A couple of examples come to mind for health and education. These may be redundant but pertinent. UNICEC reports that about one third of the children less than five years in age die from dehydration and diarrhea related diseases. I recommended that we support a high school science contest using the sun and photoelectric cells to provide lighting and heating in schools; the second prize would be awarded to the student who shows how simple household drinking water could be purified through solar exposure to heat and ultraviolet light.
Two 1.5 liter samples were to be taken properly labeled and one sample kept out of the sun while the second would be placed on a black plastic bag and exposed to solar ultraviolet and heat. Temperatures were to be recorded while the water was exposed for 6 hours or more. Temperatures were to be recorded hourly. Then both samples were to be collected and taken to the Mosul City Water Laboratory for testing. The lab would report all specific organisms found in both samples. We would then have a baseline of waterborne organisms found in both samples. If the action of solar heat and ultraviolet light were significant, those samples would be purified enough to drink safely. A second study would or could be initiated based on findings from the first study results. We would recommend expansion of the study to include a greater number of sampling points and extend the time of solar ultraviolet light and heat exposure to assure coverage during the colder months of winter. It is our intent to use the D G Health to compose health related materials based on the water study and to use the 660,000 school children to transmit that information on the basis of children as behavior change agents.
Technical experts are assigned to the PRT without fiscal funding or the ability to make policy. As different Team Leaders take the assignment they have about one year to make their “mark” within the PRT mechanism. DOS usually recruits from the assigned POS staff to further their reputations at the least risk. The current PRT Team Leader has empowered his Diplomatic Officer in two ways; she controls the approval process of the QRF and other funding mechanisms and secondly she “protects” the Team Leader from negative consequence related to funds, policy, public affair functions, and meeting the high profile targets of the DOS menu such as gender issues and related social targets. Civilian staff has been discharged for various and often petty reasons, creating an atmosphere of fear and trepidation among team members. This is especially true when the team leader’s management style is autocratic.
The DOS priorities for programming are politically orientated and not appropriately selected based on the needs of the Iraqi people. It is apparent that the Ninewa Team Leader’s decisions are based on his supervisor’s priorities and not the needs of the situation on the ground. Needs dictate that decisions be based on helping provide families with food, jobs, education and most importantly security against insurgents. This is key in reducing the power of the insurgents in Mosul City and Ninewa Province. The PRT’s mission is to reconstruct the province and prepare the population for a self sufficient, functional government. This requires extensive economic, social, education, health and USAID functions. All this is accomplished through collaboration with all our Iraqi colleagues and the US military. One obvious and creative approach to improved networking could be accomplished through contract with a proven contractor who provides a team of three experts who rotate every four to six months. This approach would solve the problem of continuity in programming based on Iraqi priorities and programs. Capacity building, establishing infrastructure, and continuity in programming would all be accomplished.
While the actual number of accomplishments was limited under the DOS leadership in Ninewa Province, the Health and Education Sector did obtain enough pediatric wheel chairs for 1300 children, established a new high school science contest, printed 100,000 anti cholera and diarrhea prevention pamphlets circulated by 40,000 school age children. We prevented cholera from infecting Ninewa Province. We obtained three vehicles for the Directorate General Education’s use in the transportation of school materials. The Japanese Government funded these vehicles. We were denied funding for a school week long project to encourage Art, Music and Theatre. A water project was denied approval. We developed a return to School project designed to return 15,000 school dropouts and recruited females to attend school for a stipend of $2.25 per day based on attendance and grades. Another proposal was designed to provide a school lunch program. Both these project were to be forward funded through the Iraqi budgetary system. We also worked on establishing an Iraqi vision for a quality national wheelchair factory, a national Rehabilitation Center in Ninewa Province and a prosthetic limb production center in collaboration with the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization and the Ministry of Health.
At the conclusion of my assignment the USAID, Chief, the local PRT staff, the Commanding Officer of the 86th CAH Hospital and the various medical officers of the 3rd ACR Regiment and the Division Surgeon honored me with their kind comments and offering their best wishes for my future. As the oldest member of the Ninewa Province PRT – at 75 years in age I thank God for giving me the opportunity and blessings of good health to complete this assignment
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Last week I pretty much bashed the Department of State process and people based on my personal and professional experiences here in Iraq. The "Miranda Memorandum" pretty much served as the major source of these observations. This week I want to be even less kind and even more opinioned. The Provincial Reconstruction Team is an integral resource and professional tool for helping our Iraqi brother and sisters develop infrastructure, build capacity, and to empower them for future transition. During the DOS training course we were taught to work with the Iraqis: “Build good relations and trust”. “Your titles doesn’t matter, just speak as a person.” “When you build partnerships, you strengthen together and accomplish more.” And “Maintain the concept ‘let’s help each other,’ I have something to learn and to teach.” These quotes are taken from the small booklet: Building Cultural Competency. There are many additional tidbits and many sound bites of such excellent information. As technical professionals we are trying to follow these simple concepts and bits of sound advice only to learn that the DOS folks have a much different agenda. They rationalize "why they won’t take our projects seriously or support them on any grounds." The flawed logic they employ is based on both good and poor empirical observations. The good part is: because they do go out and meet people. They eat, talk, socialize with the upper crust of Iraqi society and listen to what they want to hear. Their ears are tuned to hear the negative without looking for documentation or gather the facts as Joe Friday would pursue the truth. They are listening with the ears of “career enhancement” rather than those for building capacity or seeing what is really happening at the poor Iraqi household level. They leave the Sheik’s or Governors’ house or office with a full belly, lots of gossip, stern admonitions and think they now have the “inside” information that will make their career because the can inform Baghdad and Washington DOS what will happen or inside information on what will not happen. In the meantime Iraqi/American staff members and PRT staff professionals are given short shrift for ideas, concepts or supporting principles that do not fit the tight DOS paradigm.
Iraq and its people have been driven from the top down so long that it is nearly impossible for most public officials to practice “a government of the people and by the people”. We should learn from our past failures here and use both, large support components, which operate on “buy in” terms according to priorities based on the creation of jobs, and establishing security, educating the children, and providing both curative and preventive health care service. We can start with simple health and education projects that create Iraqi interest and ownership. My biggest failures include: a non-funded, simple water sampling of 50 household drinking water sampling sites starting just below the Mosul Dam and extending to a village well below the city of Mosul. This survey would involve a very simple design that would involve a person collecting pared 1.5 liters of household sourced drinking water. Both samples would be well marked and labeled. One sample would be stored in the house while the second would be placed on a black plastic bag and exposed to the sun for six or more hours. Both samples would then be taken to the water testing laboratory for complete testing. Identify all organisms found in both samples and these would be recorded and the results shared with both DGs for Health and Education. The health sector could extend this type of survey and measure the solar purification process or conduct additional research as needed. The department of education would look to the health sector to write education materials about home prevention and treatment of diarrhea, which the 660,000 students of Ninewa Province could take these messages home to mothers and fathers for improved water sanitation and awareness of water-borne diarrhea illnesses. The project would cost about $11,600. It was turned down for funding because the people can buy iodine tablets and local Clorox to add to their drinking water. We ignore that fact that 37% of the deaths of Iraqi childreen less than 5 years of age are attributable to diarrhea and dehydration!
I feel guilty because it just doesn’t make sense to me and now my feelings are mixed because even complaining here seems like sour grapes and perhaps it is just that. It is clear to me that the proposal to initiate a trial school feeding program, or to initiate a project to get “drop out” students back into the classrooms is not likely to happen nor is the provincial education printing press. Will our wheel chair factory become a reality? I will not be replaced: so a DOS staff person already here will take on these duties. Am I bitter – yeah I think so! Why? Because the things that make me weep doesn’t seem to affect DOS people so career minded they just don’t get it. What makes me cry? Many things in life: holding a small child until it falls asleep. It is being at the bedside of a loved one as they breathe their last. It is sitting beside the bodies of two of your children, powerless to change their fate. Holding the person I love most and wishing she could know how very much I love her after 50 years. It is seeing a family break up because of mistakes and sensitivity between two people who should understand that being selfish and being hurt empties one of love and the capacity to sacrifice for your children. My tears are for the innocent Iraq children as I see them on the street, war-torn, hungry, without hope, tired and in danger. It is for those who are hungry - because there are no jobs and little likelihood this economic situation will change in any near future. My tears are for those officials who are trying to do the right thing and at the same time do things right. They are for the poor and those suffering from illnesses that could be prevented and lastly these tears are for the DOS folks who just don’t get it but - know it all after two or three months being here.
Taken from the book “The Spirituality of Imperfection” by Ernst Kurtz and Katherine Ketcham (page172 and 173) – “Reuter suggests three layers of attachment that need to be peeled back sequentially, like an onion. First, we need to become detached from material gain, second from self-importance, and third from the urge to dominate others. It is only through this process of stripping away these attachments, she writes, that we can lay claim to spiritual progress.” This week I am committed to working on all three! It is a constant challenge to try and keep away from sour grapes. May God help me!
Ecclesiastes 3:1-11 says it so much better than I can. It states: “There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for everything under the heavens. A time to be born and a time to die: a time to plant and a time to uproot the plant. A time to kill and a time to heal: a time to tear down and a time to build. A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance. A time to scatter stones and a time to gather them: a time to embrace and a time, and a time to be far from embraces. A time to seek, and a time to lose; a time to keep and a time to cast away. A time to rend and a time to sew; a time to be silent, and a time to speak. A time to love and a time to hate; a time of war and a time of peace.
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It has been a crazy sort of week here because we have visitors scheduled who do not show up. We make out schedules, arrange meetings, collect documents and materials and – no one shows up. This situation is partially due to weather and scheduling by air transport. One visitor I was responsible for canceled three times so, I will not make any arrangements until she shows up.
On the good news side we were successful in getting $80K from the Japanese Grassroots fund to purchase three vehicles for the DG Education. It is a project I have been working on since January 2008. The US Army Captain who set it in motion back in February deserves the major credit. At the same time other PRT projects are refused funding for reasons unrelated to the proposal itself. Back in April and May I anticipated another cholera season in Iraq. I went to the WHO folks to obtain their Arabic cholera and diarrhea prevention pamphlets and posters. They didn't have any available but I was able to obtain their PDF files and we paid a printing company to arm us with 100,000 pamphlets and 10,000 all weather posters. We used 40,000 children to distribute these materials and to explain their content. Cholera did appear early this month but so far we have been spared. Hopefully the early prevention work paid off. Other PRTs are trying to catch up so I shared our PDF files with a distributor who can hopefully take appropriate action.
This brings me up to the general question of water and one of our simple projects that continues to be rejected for one reason or another. What we propose is a simple collection of 50 water samples collected from family drinking water sites ranging from just below the Mosul Dam to a small village at the edge of Ninewa Provincial border. The project is a simple one: each agent would collect two 1.5. Liter water samples from normal drinking water sources, label both samples carefully and accurately. One sample is to be stored in the house while the second is placed on a black plastic bag and placed in the sun for more than 6 hours. The ultraviolet light and solar heat should kill most bacteria, virus, or protozoan organisms. Both samples would be submitted to the local water testing laboratory and tested for organisms, chemicals with a final report, which we would analyze and develop a water-borne mapping of organisms found in the fifty sites and the solar effect on purification. The cost for this survey is less than $13K. So far funding has been refused.
As my tenure draws closer to an end it amazes me to know that these PRTs are staffed with technical persons with a mission to empower, enhance, create capacity and to help build Iraqi infrastructure and yet the DOS has full power to make decisions based on their own definitions. The water project has the blessing of both directors for education and health. Oh well, we will keep trying to meet our mission and provide some assistance where we can. I doubt that my position will be filled after I leave. So another major factor for failure is technical PRT continuity. Unless we realize that winning this war, from my perspective, is to raise up this current generation of Iraqi children in schools and with functional and modern curriculum, and with fully equipped science laboratories, arts, music and theater wherewithal, with water, electricity, heating and school health programs – we have lost it. Unless we assist the Iraqi educators in getting school dropouts back to classes with some incentive for both attendance and passing grades and possibly food supplement the insurgents are going to continue recruiting them to throw grenades, and to plant IEDs. What’s more we will help rise up a generation illiterate and unemployable – all because we screwed up the later possibility to help win this war. Meanwhile the unemployment rate is estimated as high as 70% in Mosul City and there is no single solution. Our leadership talks about Iraqi “buy in as measured in dollars” but I measure it in terms of empowerment, safe drinking water, reduction of preventable child mortality related to diarrhea and dehydration, pneumonia, vaccine preventable disease and maternal mortality due to a lack of adequate ANC care during pregnancy. The DOS structure reminds me of that old fable “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, by Hans Christian Anderson.
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It has been a long and in some ways a difficult week. It reminded me of a document written February 5, 2008 by Manuel Miranda. It is called the Miranda Memorandum, which was written by him upon his departure from serving one year in the Embassy in Baghdad. He excluded General Petraeus from his comments. We are here as part of the civilian “Surge initiative”. His experience and mine make it clear that while many errors have been made over time, we believe that peace requires the empowerment of the Iraqi people in every aspect of their way of life. Our Iraqi colleagues must own and participate in their government. In short, we must pacify this nation and inspire respect and confidence in their leaders.
Bluntly Miranda said that the "Department of State and the Foreign Service is not competent to do the job. These folks are hard working, intelligent and capable in many settings. They cannot successfully lead the civilian surge or to manage our civilian surge." They are not trained or prepared to do the job. Their careers will be enhanced as the result of being here but they are not able to do the job. Miranda's tour began one year ago in February 2007 and mine began December 2007 so we have about a combined 18 months experience in Iraq. Our task was to create a level of Iraqi independence, infrastructure development and to conduct just plain capacity building. Here I’ll quote directly from the Miranda document: “In particular, neither the State Department nor its Foreign Service is competent to manage and lead personnel whom have been hired and brought to Iraq as experts, or to synchronize expertise, funds, and programs to support the GOI (Government of Iraq). As managers, the Embassy’s leaders do not have the leadership profiles or management experience required by the nation’s high sacrifice of blood and treasure.”
My tenure is winding down and in a few short weeks I’ll be home. Upon reflection of what I’ve experienced verifies what Manual Miranda wrote about. I have spent months getting to know our Directorate Generals for Education and Health. I am not a super expert in education but I do something about international public health. I can certainly tell you more about what doesn’t work rather than what does work. So, I’ve invested months in getting to know the DGs and about their short and long term plans. Very simply put, their goals and plans have become my dreams as well. I have no direct access to funds, nor do I have the authority to enforce activities that I see would empower, or create infrastructure and build capacity. Together the DG Health and I share a vision for this province as the national handicapped center for rehabilitation and the location for a quality wheel chair factory capable of supplying all of Iraq. We see the possibility for collaboration with the Iraq Red Crescent Organization to produce prosthetic limbs. Eventually I aspire to see a program for training community health workers and to train women as antenatal care workers but these are a long way off. We see a 500 unit per day capacity blood bank to serve the two million people in this immediate area. There is action to complete a project that would increase capacity in one main hospital to conduct cardiac surgery. In four weeks my continuity will be interrupted and probably some FSO will take over. Without a replacement to hand over these projects and networking ties my guess is they will not go far. If we were given a set budget to work with we could start projects and programs to strengthen the capacity of our Iraqi partners and the next technical expert could do “relief pitching” until their projects are developed.
The Director General (DG) for Education has my special admiration and apprecitation. She is a remarkable woman in a man's world. She just might be the Sarah Palin of Iraq. Her vision is to win the children of our province by providing top quality education and exercise innovative means for achieving these goals. She knows that children are at great risk to insurgent violence and kidnapping. She tells about visiting a school to find one child taking a test and finding the child crying. SO, she asks the child why she is crying – the child answers, because she is hungry! So we have developed a school lunch program that will cost $6 million for the start-up year. She has budgeted for subsequent years. Is the any hope of us funding that project? There is no means for that possibility to even be considered. I try three other donors and hope one of them comes through. We envision a Return to School program where we take a 15000 student cohort and recruit them to return to classes. There are about 250,000 such kids’ age 12 to 17 on the streets. We would pay a $2.25 per day stipend and provide some food supplement contingent upon both attendance and maintaining passing grades. Again she has budgeted for future years but needs to get the start-up year money. Again I’ll look around to see what I can find as a new source or a new donor. I could go on for hours about this sort of plans for enriching these children through education for both academic and vocational schools.
The inclination here is to forget these projects and transform the PRT into a US Consulate staffed by diplomats, who will produce the “inability to respond to the urgency of America’s presence in Iraq, and the inclination to make excuses and blame the Embassy’s failures on others” – another quote from the Miranda Memorandum. I’ve got to quit this meandering because it is too complex an issue to really try and cover in one setting. Perhaps I’ll try again next week but it is midnight and time to sleep.
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